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Abstract
This article examines how corporate crime is organised through studying the longevity
of illegal business cartels. Previous studies demonstrate cartels can remain undetected
for years or decades. Similar to criminal networks, cartel participants need to commu-
nicate in order to collaborate effectively, but operate covertly at the same time. The case
study analysis of fourteen Dutch cartel cases in this study demonstrates two main
findings. First, cartel participants communicate frequently and elaborately, and the need
for trust and communication impedes concealment. Second, the longevity of cartels
cannot be explained by isolation from but by embeddedness in their social environ-
ment. The context of legitimacy and a facilitating environment are significant factors.
Criminal collaboration is studied extensively in literature on organised crime, however
gained little attention in the literature on corporate crime. Hereby, this study contributes
to an understanding of how corporate criminal conduct is organised, by applying
relevant theory on criminal networks gleaned from the literature on organised crime.
Introduction
Criminal acts committed through collaboration between criminal partners require not
only concealment but also communication. Communication is essential in organising
crime: namely, making arrangements regarding the required resources, contacts and
transport; settling disputes; and dividing criminal profits [1]. The balance between
operational efficiency through communication and secrecy through concealment is a
widely known trade-off for participants of any covert network. The paradox of con-
cealment and communication is a focal point in the study of illegal and criminal
networks [2–4]. In the literature, concealment and communication are often presented
as opposites, operating as communicating vessels [5–7].
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As with any criminal network, business cartels – e.g. price-fixing, bid-rigging – need
to coordinate collective actions efficiently by communicating while facing the risk of
exposure. Firms have to exchange information on prices, customers, tendering proce-
dures and so on; internal issues and disputes must be resolved; and acceptable
agreements on compensations must be reached between participants [8, 9]. In light of
increasing enforcement efforts and the criminalisation of business cartels [10–12],
perpetrators of cartel conduct must also conceal their activities from customers, non-
participants, and internal and external watchdogs.
Despite the risk of detection, many cartels remain active for years, even decades [13,
14]. For instance, the recent European price-fixing truck cartel lasted for 14 consecutive
years (IP/16/2582), and is no exception (cf. [13]). This raises questions as to how
business cartels succeed in remaining undetected for long periods, considering the
increased pressure on revealing cartel conduct and their need for communication and
coordination. Are there effective social control mechanisms within cartels that ensure
long-lasting secrecy? Do cartels employ effective modus operandi of concealment?
Does a silent or even cooperative social environment ensure cartels of their longevity?
Although these are familiar questions with regard to criminal networks, they have
received limited attention thus far in the literature on cartels.
Cartels consist of illegal activities in otherwise legal networks [15] and the question as
to how cartels deal with communication and secrecy should be addressed accordingly.
Considering cartels as communication networks has rarely been done (cf. [6, 8]). Recent
studies that do adopt an organised crime perspective regarding the organisation of serious
crimes such as fraud and bribery have demonstrated that this provides a fruitful approach
for studying corporate and white-collar crime [16–19]. It exposes the nature and structure
of these crimes, and sheds light on new criminal opportunities and systematic causes for
corporate and white-collar crime. Business cartels can be seen as a form of corporate and
thereby organisational crime [20–22] in which legitimate firms, business relations, and
transactions provide the context for illegitimate conduct [23, 24]. Business cartels are
inherently incorporated in legal networks and legitimate firms [15]. However, earlier
studies demonstrate how covertness and secrecy are important dimensions of cartel
conduct. Both within and outside companies involved in cartel agreements, covertness
is an important aspect (cf. the Vitamins cartel, [25]). This exemplifies how much of what
happens in firms is shaped by informal and unwritten processes [26, 27].
Hence, this article applies the criminological notions on the functioning of illegal
and criminal networks to the nature and structure of business cartels. First, using these
insights – rather than legal and economic theory – enables a broader understanding with
regard to the longevity and effective secrecy of cartels. Applying social theory to study
corporate crime and in particular cartels enables to reach beyond the idea of both the
homo economicus (the rational actor, cf. [28]) and the homo juridicus (the legal actor
that knows and recognises the law, cf. [29]) in understanding and explaining cartel
conduct. Second, the empirical findings of this article shed new light on the theoreti-
cally assumed tension between communication and concealment in illegal networks.
By investigating how cartels are organised, this article applies insights gained from
extensive study of covert and criminal networks to cartel agreements. Employing that
perspective, this study builds upon the work of Levi [18], Passas [30] and Ruggiero
[31], where corporate and white-collar crime is studied by examining the mobilisation
of existing resources and networks.
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Secrecy and trust in criminal networks
Two lines of thought within the literature on criminal networks are discussed: one that
departs from the concept of the ‘secret society’ and the trade-off between communica-
tion and concealment, and one that focuses on the importance of mutual trust and social
networks for operating in illegality. These insights are subsequently translated into
expectations regarding cartels.
Criminal networks as secret societies
Several sociological studies on covert networks and criminal networks like terrorist
groups and mafia families depart from a trade-off between communication and con-
cealment ([2–6, 32], p. 63; [7, 33]). These studies employ the classical concept of the
secret society as their conceptual point of departure. Networks that maximise for
concealment and are strongly isolated from their environment – like Freemasonry or
WWII resistance groups – are also characterised as secret societies [34, 35]. Georg
Simmel introduced the concept of the secret society as follows: […] ‘an interactional
unit characterized in its totality by the fact that reciprocal relations among its members
are governed by the protective function of secrecy’ [34, 35]. Simmel [35] elaborated on
two central circumstances in the secret society: namely, members are concerned with
the protection of ideas, objects, activities, and sentiments to which they attach positive
value; and members seek protection by controlling the distribution of information about
the valued elements. According to Simmel’s concept, outside pressure towards certain
ideas and activities of a group enhances the likelihood of secret societies forming.
The literature on criminal networks that uses the concept of the secret society
describes different examples in which criminal networks deal with the expected
trade-off between concealment and communication. One example is the ‘Cupola’
within the Cosa Nostra. This ‘commission’ of highly ranked experienced men within
the Cosa Nostra was supposedly responsible for internal dispute settlement ([1], p. 61).
These men held a key information position regarding the illegal activities of the Cosa
Nostra ‘family’, but were themselves never directly involved in criminal activities. This
shielded them from prosecution by the authorities and law enforcement. This example
suggests a form of centralisation of communication and information. A second exam-
ple of how illegal networks deal with the assumed trade-off between communication
and concealment are terrorist groups. Terrorist groups are known to operate and
communicate through a decentralised cell structure. People within a cell know each
other, but do not possess information concerning how the overarching network outside
the cell is organised or know the identity of participants of other cells [3, 36].
In theory, prioritising either for concealment or for effective communication leads to
a different network structure. Prioritising for concealment is expected to lead to a
decentralised network, while prioritising for effective communication is expected to
lead to a centralised network [6]. Networks that are focused on effective communica-
tion leave their participants more vulnerable to detection and punishment. In contrast,
networks that are focused on concealment are less successful in generating effective
communication, which is detrimental to the network’s operational efficiency [6, 37].
The aspect for which networks prioritise is expected to depend on the need to act and
the accompanying need for and frequency of communication [5–7]. This means that
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terrorist groups are more prone to prioritise for concealment than for communication,
because they require less continuous action and therefore less communication [7].
Moreover, covert social networks are therefore expected to be project-oriented [38].
In short, decentralised networks provide better protection against detection of its
members, while centralised networks provide more effective communication. In light
of the literature, it is expected that cartels limit their frequency of communication with
regard to their need to operate covertly. The degree of communication within the
network is expected to be minimalised, and participants share information only on a
need-to-know basis (cf. [33]).
Criminal networks as networks of trust
For decades, the classic concept of secret societies was also the image that existed of
organised crime. Contemporary literature suggests that communication and conceal-
ment go hand-in-hand. Instead of a paradox, they are both regarded as imperative to the
longevity of criminal networks [39–41]. The classic image of criminal networks as
being centralised and hierarchical is also outdated by criminological research into
organised crime and has been adjusted to being an image of the flexible criminal
‘entrepreneur’ [42–45]. Owing to the need to be flexible and secretive, most criminal
networks involved in organised crime are unlikely to become large-scale ‘enterprises’
with a clear structure, hierarchy, and bureaucracy [46].1 Criminal networks are more
likely to function horizontally and through means of decentralised communication
structures. In these structures trust, again plays an important role.
The literature on organised crime demonstrates how mutual trust is of great impor-
tance to the functioning of criminal networks [39–41]. Trust is considered to work in
two ways − it is important both for effective communication and for the successful
concealment of illegal activities. Indeed, communication is considered a condition for
concealment in criminal networks. In this sense, trust functions as a linking pin in the
operation of criminal networks. In some contemporary literature, communication and
concealment are therefore not considered a trade-off but two equally pivotal impera-
tives for the functioning of criminal networks. Trust is strongest in pre-existing social
relations: namely, strong ties. Therefore, most participants in illegal networks are
recruited from existing social networks [47]. Strong social ties, like family ties (cf.
[48]), provide trustworthy partners that are discrete towards outsiders with regard to the
illegal activities. Unlike conclusions in the literature that are based on the trade-off
between communication and concealment, trust can be built through elaborate com-
munication [40, 41]. However, strong ties do also present a possible liability relating to
concealment, because potential evidence is scattered when information is exchanged
elaborately. Ultimately, trust is a function of expectations, and has to do with building a
reputation of trustworthiness [6]. A shared past provides input for this reputation, and a
shared future creates the need for it [49].
1 This does not negate the fact that vertically organised hierarchical criminal organisations (e.g. the Cosa
Nostra) exist. However, they are neither the only form of organised crime nor do they exclusively control the
illegal markets. Paoli states this in her ‘paradoxes of organized crime’. One of these paradoxes entails that
organisations that are effective in illegal markets, due to their flexible and horizontal structure, are unfit
because of their nature to develop into large-scale criminal ‘enterprises’.
Jaspers J.D.
At the same time, it is important for criminal networks to work not only with
trustworthy partners but also with capable partners: namely, people who can provide
certain skills, contacts, and resources that are essential to the illegal conduct ([50], p.
51). Therefore, criminal networks also tend to use potential partners outside of their
existing social network. This is referred to as the strength of weak ties [51, 52]. Because
participants in criminal networks sometimes need to work with these weak ties, they
use what is called trust-substitutes − forms of ‘hostage-taking’ to increase cooperation
among co-offenders [53]. When there is a lack of trust in legitimate business relations,
parties can use certain securities that increase the costs of opportunistic behaviour, such
as contracts with fines or bounties. Within criminal networks, participants rely on
alternative resources. One of these resources can be the threat of violence, such as
‘hostage-taking’ ([50], p. 66; [1, 45, 53]). However, the actual use of violence often
appears to be a costly strategy insofar as it attracts unwanted attention from enforce-
ment authorities, which results in caution in applying it [45, 54, 55]. In addition, the use
of violence might prevent partners from cheating, but can at the same time result in
losing other, potential partners ([1], p. 36).
In short, based on the literature it is expected that cartels focus strongly on effective
communication because of the importance of mutual trust, and not primarily on
concealment. In addition, cartels are expected to focus on generating mutual
trust, and to communicate frequently in order to achieve this goal. Firms
within cartels are expected to use existing social ties (strong ties), and also
to seek capable business partners with whom they do not have a history of
cooperation − and trust (weak ties) − because these ties prove to be essential
for establishing specific goals. The use of weak ties leads firms within cartels
to make use of trust-substitutes.
Criminal networks and social embeddedness
The fact that criminal conduct can remain hidden from outsiders might not only be due
to the operation of the network itself − it may be explained by the relation of the
network to its social environment. Do isolation and covertness truly protect members of
criminal networks against detection? Or does it make them more vulnerable to suspi-
cion and detection? An alternative explanation is that neither isolation nor exclusion
but the social embeddedness of crime and criminal networks protects its members
against detection [30, 56, 57]. Scholars have suggested that most crime is committed
within an informed and even cooperative social environment [58, 59]. The
embeddedness of illegal activities in legal networks, organisations, and platforms
provides a silent social environment that operates as a shell surrounding criminal
networks.
In other words, to answer the question how cartels succeed in hiding their activities
from outsiders for long periods of time, the relation of the cartel and its participants
with their social environment is also important. In the existing literature, the concept of
social embeddedness is used to describe this process [51, 52, 57]. Social embeddedness
entails both structural and relational embeddedness. It concerns institutional aspects,
such as the role of licit organisations, services, and communication platforms, and the
function of social relations of criminal network participants with people outside or
inside the periphery of this network. Regarding the role of facilitators, social
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embeddedness is discussed extensively in the literature on criminal networks [60, 61].
Facilitators are considered to be licit actors2 that intentionally or unintentionally fulfil a
role in the illegal activities of the criminal network: for instance, the role that solicitors
and lawyers play in laundering criminal money [62–64], or the role of companies and
entrepreneurs in the transport sector in the traffic and trade of illegal goods [39, 65].
Business cartels as criminal networks
As previously stated, the expectation is that many of the traits, dilemmas, and processes
relevant for most illegal and criminal networks contribute to an understanding and an
explanation of the operation of business cartels. However, cartels do possess certain
particularities that must be addressed. First, because cartels deal with agreements
between business competitors, mutual trust and communication are expected to be
essential, but are also more problematic for the operation of cartels. Self-interest and
opportunism can form challenges for competitors to work together. This raises the
question as to whether cartel participants use trust-substitutes, and, if so, in what shape
or form do these trust-substitutes occur. Second, cartel conduct entails illegal activities
that take place within the normal course of doing business: namely, within licit
organisations (cf. [20–22]). Therefore, is it easier to shroud cartel conduct in a sphere
of legality (cf. [23, 24, 66])?
By now, one could reflect on the question whether the context of, for example,
working out misunderstandings within price-fixing cartels could be further away from
dealing with conflict over missed payments between hardened drug criminals. The
Dutch fruit trader Rinus M. found out about this difference the hard way. When he
became involved in transporting illegal drugs and a shipment went missing, he
tried to resolve the issue using business mores, but was confronted with those
of organised crime: namely, intimidation and eventually assassination (NRC,
16th September 2016). Although there are obvious differences between business
cartels and other forms of organised crime, such as the use of violence, this
paper argues that it is fruitful to apply insights on criminal cooperation, gained
in studies on organised criminal networks, to business cartels. This can help to
explain the nature of cartel networks and their longevity, and to provide input
with regard to considering enforcement strategies.
In conclusion, a criminal network perspective, including notions of secrecy, trust and
social embeddedness, provides several reasons as to why criminal conduct remains
hidden from the public for long periods. Three main expectations are: (1) criminal
networks may not be as centralised and hierarchically organised as in the classic image
of the ‘secret society’; (2) criminal networks may not only prioritise for concealment
but also for effective communication; (3) it is not isolation from their social environ-
ment but their embeddedness that provides an explanation for the longevity of criminal
networks.
2 Therefore, although they are not referred to as facilitators for the purpose of this article, illicit actors involved
in facilitating crime, such as a hitman or a forger of passports, are sometimes also labelled facilitators in the
existing literature [31, 61].
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Methods and data sources
This article examines cartel stability based on a qualitative case file analysis of 14
Dutch cases. In these cases, the Dutch Competition Authority imposed an administra-
tive fine between October 2007 and January 2012.3 These cases were selected because
reports that lead to a fine contain substantial proof, including documentation on
coordination and communication within cartels. This documentation allowed for a
systematic and in-depth study of the structure and nature of cartels. The cases were
examined using document analysis and semi-structured interviews with case managers
from the Authority for Consumers and Markets. The sources are official reports by the
authority,4 summarising the files and containing a selection of evidence used in
administrative proceedings towards fines imposed upon corporations. These files
contain descriptions of the modus operandi of cartels including: correspondence
between their members, transcriptions of verbal interrogations with corporate officials
by the competition authority, and sources of cartel administration. These statements are
supported by additional written administration.
The material was studied systematically, using a checklist focusing on the modus
operandi for concealment; the type of network; the nature of mutual relations; the role
of the social environment (e.g. industry associations, customers); and mechanisms for
mutual trust. For every case, the document analysis was complemented with a semi-
structured interview with the project manager of the authority that handled the inves-
tigation. In these interviews, the following topics were discussed: the nature of the
cartel; the type of network and communication; mechanisms for mutual control and
trust; and the role of third parties. These interviews served to provide a better overview
of the files and an opportunity to ask additional questions that could not be answered in
full through studying the written reports.
The use of secondary sources in this study leads to several limitations. Because of
detection and enforcement biases, the cases not necessarily provide a representative
image of all cartel conduct in the Netherlands. Some cartels have greater chances of
being detected, and cases that involve substantial proof have a higher chance of
ultimately resulting in an administrative fine. The statements of corporate officials
referred to in this article originate from secondary sources, and therefore might express
firms’ perspectives, but were originally made in the course of an administrative
procedure. Note that one of the formal legal requirements of finding a person or
corporation guilty of an infringement is that the effects of the infringement must be
‘noticeable’ and have a significant effect on the market. This might lead some of the
corporate officials to deny the ‘real’ effect of any agreements made as a legal defence
strategy, or to under-report their conduct in general.
3 Commissioning administrative fines is one of the possible sanctions authorised by Dutch competition law
(according to Art. 56 lid 1 sub a Mw). Since October 2007, Dutch competition law has allowed the
investigation of private property and the possibility of fining natural persons (Kamerstukken I 2006/07,
30,071, A). October 2007 was the starting point of the analysis for the sake of comparability of the material.
January 2012 was indicated as end date because cases usually take several years from the initial investigation
until the official sanction. All cases completed by January 2012 have been included.
4 These files are a result of investigations based on the legal power invested in the Dutch competition authority
to interrogate corporate officials and to demand corporate intelligence (Art. 5:16 Awb); to investigate company
and private property and administration (Art. 5:15, art. 54, 55 Mw); and to use leniency requests and other
relevant informants and public information.
Strong by concealment? How secrecy, trust, and social embeddedness...
Table 1 presents descriptive information on the selected cases, including the cartel’s
duration,5 number of firms, and nature of the conduct.6 The relatively high number of
firms in these cases can be biased due to three main issues. First, cartels with an active
industry association have a greater chance of detection. Second, cartels with a more
limited number of firms may conspire more effectively, with little chance of detection.
Third, an effective cartel may have a self-amplifying effect, as the collusion can offer
more firms an opportunity to survive.
The Dutch cases in this study have an average duration of about five years, which is
comparable to the typical duration of cartels [14]. The duration shows that firms
manage to conceal their cartel for several years, despite the large number of partici-
pants. This suggests effective communication, and raises several questions. What are
the methods of concealment? How do firms deal in practice with theoretically expected
trade-offs between communication and concealment? Which network structure does
this result in? And what role do trust, existing networks, and facilitators play?
Table 1 also states the nature of the conduct. Three main categories are distin-
guished: bid-rigging, price-fixing, and market division or allocation. These categories
serve as descriptive labels – based on legal definitions – indicating the main category of
the infringement, though these categories are not mutually exclusive per se. Bid-rigging
involves firms in a tendering procedure, communicating before the bidding takes place.
They divide the work and rotate bids, thereby rigging the procedure. Also known as
collusive tendering, this generally involves raising price offers to the buyer. In price-
fixing cartels, firms make explicit agreements on the price or surcharge of a particular
product or service. Firms use, for instance, minimum pricelists. The other cases involve
market division or allocation. In these cartels, firms agree to fix market shares or divide
markets into geographical regions.
Results and discussion
The 14 Dutch cartel cases are discussed in light of the question as to how cartels can
remain undetected for long periods, and how participants deal with trust, communica-
tion, and concealment. Derived from the literature on illegal and criminal networks,
three main theoretical expectations are investigated in relation to cartel conduct and
presented accordingly: (1) exchange of information in cartels is not as centralised and
hierarchically organised as in the classic image of the ‘secret society’; (2) trust
enables cooperation in cartels, and participants build this trust through elaborate
communication or by using trust-substitutes; (3) it is not the isolation of cartels
from their social environment but social embeddedness that provides an explanation
for their longevity.
5 To determine the duration of these cartels, the period of continuous infringement stated in the report is used.
This also means that the period before the introduction of the Dutch cartel prohibition (January 1998) is not
incorporated in determining the duration. This suggests an underestimation of the actual duration of the cartel.
This effect is enhanced by the internal selection bias of the competition authority concerning the minimum
standards regarding evidence.
6 In light of confidentiality, the industry in which the cartels took place cannot be indicated per case in Table 1.
The cases took place in the following industries; construction (6); heavy industry (3); general services industry
(2); forestry (1); waste disposal (1); and financial services (1).
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Concealment and communication
In line with what could be expected from earlier studies into business cartels ([6];
[67]; [23], p. 98), the Dutch cases do show methods of concealment, such as
limiting face-to-face interaction and minimising the channels of communication.
Examples of this include phased price increases; minimalising the frequency of
communication; meetings in neutral locations (i.e. not at the offices or on
personal premises of the firms or corporate officials involved); discrete mutual
compensations (e.g. in kind, or discounts to supplies); and the use of codes.
Some cases involve communication exclusively by phone or in person. Most
meetings took place in neutral locations, such as conference rooms, restaurants,
hotels and so on. With regard to the meetings in case 2, the secretary of the
cartel stated the following:
‘The meetings were held in alternating locations. This would typically not take
place at the actual offices of one of the firms’. (2)
In case 8, one of the cartel participants − in a conversation with his cartel partner − even
refers to the risk of communicating over the phone, and stresses the need to meet in
person. This episode of a recorded telephone conversation is related to bid-rigging, and
is directed at trading information on who takes part in a particular tendering procedure:
‘A: Would you be able to drop by the office this morning?
B: Yes, let’s see, because tomorrow is the bidding for project of [name of street]
right?
A: 4 pm, could you make it?
(…)
Table 1 Descriptive information on selected cartel cases
Case # Duration in years Number of firms Nature of the conduct Collective market share
Case 1 6 9 Market division 70%
Case 2 8 9 Price-fixing 85–90%
Case 3 6 8 Bid-rigging 60–80%
Case 4 6 5 Market division 60–80%
Case 5 6 5 Bid-rigging –
Case 6 1 9 Bid-rigging –
Case 7 7 15 Market division 90%
Case 8 1 2 Bid-rigging –
Case 9 6 15 Market division 87.3%
Case 10 1.5 4 Price-fixing 58%
Case 11 2 3 Bid-rigging 85–95%
Case 12 9 14 Bid-rigging –
Case 13 3.5 10 Market allocation –
Case 14 11 4 Market allocation 35–50%
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B: Yeah, no, it would be better to meet at yours before, because I also have some
background information. I would prefer discussing it with you in private (…)
A: Because, uhm, yes.. around 2 pm, could you make that, or no?
B: Yeah ok, that could work, I will just stick around here in [name city]’. (8)
The cases show that as well as minimalising written communication, cartel participants
also try to minimalise communication in general. This is demonstrated by the use of
impersonal systems of communication, such as a circulation system by ‘taking turns’ in
bid-rigging cartels (also referred to as ‘phases-of-the-moon system’); pre-determined
geographical allocations; lists with client distributions; and minimum pricelists. These
systems can make abundant personal contact and correspondence superfluous, and can
thereby minimise the risk of detection and written evidence at a later stage. However,
the paradox here is that building mutual trust, which can be done through extensive and
frequent personal communication, is hindered by the use of these impersonal ‘buffers’
(cf. [37], p. 78).
At the same time – antithetic to the previously mentioned studies − the cases show
how cartel participants tend to document a significant part of their agreements and
communication. This is demonstrated by elaborate written overviews, individual and
collective turnover lists, client lists, minutes of plenary sessions etc. (cf. [56, 68]). This
exemplifies that minimalising mutual communication and using impersonal systems of
communication is not sufficient for cartels to operate. In particular, the risk of oppor-
tunistic behaviour and miscommunication demonstrably leads to frequent communica-
tion between cartel participants. A strong illustration of this is the following quote from
a secretary of one of the cartels in which he refers to the functioning of instruments
such as price lists and the discrepancy between theory and practice:
‘The function of a price list is that it indicates the price which others should
exceed. Actually, the meetings would have been superfluous if everyone in the
cartel would stick to the list. Because it was fixed […] Word on the street however
was that firms would deviate from the agreed upon prices frequently’. (4)
In most cases, effective communication is prioritised over concealment. Case 14, which
dealt with a market allocation, also demonstrates this point. The commercial depart-
ments of the firms involved in this cartel, which deal with acquiring new customers,
had to be brought up to speed on the implications of the cartel agreement (which meant
only acquiring customers from their own region). To the question of who was aware of
the illegal conduct, the project leader of ACM answered:
‘Executives and commercial managers. At the dawn raids in the offices of the
firms, maps were seen with a visualisation of the market allocation at the desks of
the commercial staff. They were at least required to know the implications of the
market allocation agreements when they were on the phone with potential
customers. So actually, everyone that was required to be informed, was
informed’. (14)
Case 14 clearly illustrates how participants in the cartel exchanged information only on
a need-to-know basis (cf. [33]).
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Nevertheless, the need for secrecy in relation to effective communication can indeed
result in practical dilemmas. In the operation of case 3, the trade-off between secrecy and
operational efficiency is illustrated clearly along with the inherent limitations of maximising
covert networks for concealment. The participating firms in case 3 used code names to refer
to clients when using the centralised dedicated phone and fax line to communicate on new
offers. They employed abbreviations to refer to different municipalities − their clients in this
case. In one instance of communication, one firm reported an offer of ‘R in NB’ and ‘R in
ZH’. As a result, this caused some confusion among the other firms, with 12 faxes (of
questions/answers) exchanged on this issue. There was considerable confusion as to which
codes belonged towhichmunicipalities, illustrating how the need for concealment interferes
directly with the need for effective communication. In addition, it shows how the need for
effective communication prevails over the need for concealment. This can be well under-
stood from a practical viewpoint, since the illegal networks’ main goal cannot be achieved
without clear communication. In other words, if members of illegal networks fail to
understand each other, the whole existence of the network is pointless. These findings
hereby contradict the theoretical assumption that illegal networks prioritise for concealment
but confirm the expectation that prioritising for effective communication can come at the
expense of concealment [6]. The paradox here is that the more one strives for concealment
(e.g. by using codes or other impersonal systems of communication), the more frequently
one eventually needs to communicate. Also, it concurs well with other studies that show if
resources are concentrated amongst a few, the network is likely to be concentrated [38].
The level of centralisation
The centralised communication system from case 3 is no exception. Noticeably, most
of the cases show clear forms of centralisation in the communication structures that are
employed by cartel participants. This shows that cartels do not necessarily prioritise for
concealment, and that they operate in a highly centralised manner. Illustrative examples
include the use of collective summaries and administration of the agreements or third
parties that function as secretary or chair of the cartel. This is also demonstrated by case
5, in which one of the participants discusses the method of communication in the cartel
that entails a bid-rigging conspiracy:
‘Everyone was audited, it was a form of division of projects […] We all did our
own calculations on the price. No one would accept exceptionally high prices.
The coordinator and the one whose turn it was to get the project would debate on
the conditions in these general meetings’. (5)
To achieve the cartel’s objectives, it appears to be important that the participants
communicate frequently and extensively, meet in person, and document their agree-
ments in writing to ensure that participants can take each other at their word. This
seems counter-intuitive from a perspective of secrecy, regardless of how collective and
plenary communication reveals a pragmatic strategy of cartels in building mutual trust.
This seems to be related to the essential role of trust in business cartels, where
opportunistic behaviour is a perceived risk with regard to participating firms. Concep-
tually, however, it remains unclear whether elaborate communication and administra-
tion should be perceived as a function of trust or of distrust (cf. [9]).
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The role of trust and trust-substitutes
Considering the pivotal role that trust plays in cartels, it is unsurprising and in line with
the expectations derived from the literature that pre-existing social and professional
networks play a significant role in the Dutch cartel cases. Existing ties between
competitors, through different platforms within the sector or because firms did
business together in the past, can lead to or provide an opportunity for
agreements on prices or market division. This confirms the theoretical expecta-
tion that having a history of working together strengthens a reputation for being
trustworthy (cf. [47]). However, not all cases involve pre-existing relations, or
strong ties, between the cartel participants. As well as trustworthy partners,
cartel members also need capable partners. As stated earlier, cartels entail
agreements between competitors in which the chance for opportunistic behav-
iour is ever present. Nevertheless, participants in these cartels find solutions for
cooperating with weak ties.
As expected from the literature on criminal networks, cartels also have forms of
guarantees or ‘insurances’ against opportunistic behaviour, which can be characterised
as trust-substitutes (cf. [53]). First, there are systems of clearing scores (cf. [68, 69]), in
which built-up differences between participants are compensated with regard to agreed-
upon turnover quota, geographical allocation, or client distributions. For this purpose,
mutual discounts on supplies, false invoices, or other transactions are used. In addition,
in cartels where clients or projects (e.g. bids) are divided or rotated, a common future
(referred to as shadow of the future, cf. [49]) also induces mutual trust. A system of
reciprocity leads to participants anticipating the work that will come their way
in the future. Second, case 9 contains several examples of the use of trust-
substitutes. A relatively large number of firms – 15 − were involved in this
case. An example from case 9 is the collective purchase of a bankrupt factory.
A large factory, suited for the production of the product involved in the case,
came up for sale. The cartel participants were afraid that commissioning the
factory by a third party would disturb their conspiracy to control the national
market. A third party then purchased the factory on behalf of the cartel, which
provided the financial means and instructions for the take-over. The factory was
dismantled and the equipment and machines from the factory were divided
amongst the participants of the cartel, but − as was discovered later − were
never actually put to use. With a provision in the private legal agreement (the
purchasing contract), the participants made sure the factory could no longer be
used for production of the designated product. The financial investment func-
tioned as a vouch for the market division agreement. Everyone had now
invested financial means in a successful execution of the agreement, and had
something tangible to lose if it failed.
The role of trust and trust-substitutes is in line with what was expected from the
literature on criminal networks. Note, however, that with cartels − and in contrast to
some forms of organised crime − trust-substitutes are always − seemingly − legitimate
means, such as collective loans, mortgages and so on, which create mutual dependen-
cies and increase the collective interest in the cartel being successful. This makes it all
the more difficult for enforcement authorities to detect these legitimate forms of
cooperation between firms within the context of illegal cartel conduct.
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Social embeddedness of illegal cartel agreements
In almost all cases in this study, industry associations and related formal communica-
tion platforms play an important role in the cartel. At a minimum, they provide an
opportunity for firms in a market to get to know each other, but sometimes these
platforms play a more active role. In case 5, firms used a calculation firm as a platform
to rig tendering procedures. A calculation firm normally offers consultancy to all
companies in the market to measure and calculate the surfaces and equipment needed
for a particular project. This way, firms in the sector can share costs of calculation to
decrease the losses on calculating projects that they do not get to execute. This is a
common and authorised way of doing business. However, the owner of the calculation
firm took it one step further by actively hosting illegal cartel meetings between the
competitors and documenting their agreements for them. In case 7, the participating
firms initially came together to discuss transport safety issues regarding their product.
However, prices and clients were also discussed here, resulting in an illegal client
distribution between competitors. In case 14, the firms had a ‘soft-franchise’ system in
place. They collectively owned a subsidiary to make legitimate agreements – such as
sharing research and development costs – but also made illegal agreements − such as
market allocation agreements dividing costumers. The following quote from case 10
illustrates more clearly how industry associations can provide an opportunity for cartel
conduct, and can therefore be seen as a form of structural embeddedness of cartels:
‘The industry association [A] and industry association [B] served as communi-
cation platforms, in which the members would discuss topics that affected the
industry as a whole. Topics like pensions, labour conditions and collective
employment agreements […] In between the lines the point was suggested that:
‘we should do something about it [the prices]’. (10)
As regards cartel facilitators, intentional and unintentional facilitators can be distinguished.
In case 5, for instance, the owner of a calculation firm knowingly and deliberately facilitated
cartel conduct. The role that different secretaries and chairmen play in several of the cases
can also be seen as deliberately facilitating cartels (e.g. cases 2 and 4). In other cases, clients
invited contractors to assess the project on site, which enabled all the requested potential
contractors to know which other parties would take part in the tendering procedure. This
provided them with an opportunity to rig the procedure, which can be qualified as
unintentional facilitation by clients (cases 5 and 7). Clearly, an agreement with a competitor
can potentially be made quickly, and many legitimate collaborative platforms and formal
meetings can provide an opportunity for cartel conduct to take place.
Discussion
In short, three main expectations in this study were: (1) cartels may not be as centralised
and hierarchically organised as in the classic image of the ‘secret society’; (2) cartels
may not only prioritise for concealment but also for effective communication; and (3) it
is not isolation from their social environment but their (natural) embeddedness that
provides an explanation for the longevity of cartels.
Strong by concealment? How secrecy, trust, and social embeddedness...
First, to avoid the risk of detection, cartels clearly use techniques aimed at
concealing their illegal conduct. However, the case study analysis illustrates how cartel
participants are focused primarily on bringing about well-functioning agreements, and
they therefore – in a pragmatic manner − communicate frequently and in a centralised
manner. Paradoxically, efforts to conceal by means of impersonal communication
methods, such as phases-of-the-moon systems (rotating bids by taking turns) and price
lists, can lead to a need for more communication and documentation. Cartelists also try
to ensure that co-conspirators keep their end of the agreement. Opportunism is per-
ceived a large risk by cartel participants, and increases the need for centralised
communication and extensive documentation of agreements. This illustrates how the
need for mutual trust often prevails over concealment of conduct by minimising the
means of communication. However, further study and discussion is needed to deter-
mine whether the elaborate systems of communication and sometimes administration
are to be considered instruments for building trust or are in fact indications of the lack
of trust.
Second, the use of trust-substitutes and the role of facilitators demonstrate how
cartels are strongly embedded in their social environment and can emanate from pre-
existing professional and personal networks. Cartel participants, in contrast to most
‘classic’ types of organised criminals, can thereby shroud themselves in a context of
legitimate business interactions. The perpetrators of cartel conduct can be considered
trusted criminals [23, 24, 66]. Corporate and white-collar crime perpetrators often rise
above suspicion, and are facilitated by a cooperative and silent social environment. The
position of these perpetrators and the fact that they act on behalf of the organisation -
particularly in cartels - hereby creates a smokescreen for enforcement authorities, which
complicates their detection efforts [56].
Third, this study demonstrates that the longevity of cartel secrecy is explained not so
much by concealment or internal control within the cartel as it is by the embeddedness
of cartels in their social environment. This is also illustrated by the use of trust-
substitutes (in the form of loans, mortgages, etc.). Furthermore, the role that facilitators
play in cartels is made evident from examples of imprudent clients, actively involved
secretaries and chairmen of cartels, or – for example − members of collective market
associations. The added difficulty in distinguishing the intentional and unintentional
facilitation of illegal activities is the distance that exists between the actions of the
facilitator and the illegal conduct of the network. This distance provides facilitators
with an opportunity to evade moral and legal accountability for their actions (cf. [70]).
Conclusion
This article explored the organisation of corporate and white-collar crime. This brings
up a few points for consideration in the field of both organised and corporate and white-
collar crime. Theoretical implications for the study of corporate crime are that, although
one can draw a few parallels in the operation of criminal networks in organised crime
(e.g. importance of trust; the use of trust-substitutes; social embeddedness), an impor-
tant difference lies in the vast opportunities that corporate crime perpetrators have at
their disposal to shroud their activities in a context of legitimacy and licit corporate
conduct. This might also explain why most organised forms of corporate crime do not
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require types of intimidation or violence in the event of conflict. As regards corporate
criminal conduct, an oblivious or cooperative social environment provides practical
opportunities for businesses to create and maintain illegal agreements. When it comes
to the body of work describing the trade-off between concealment and communication,
the theoretical implication for the study of organised crime is that illegal or criminal
networks might not always prioritise for concealment. They can operate through
elaborate communication and go beyond information exchange on a need-to-know
basis, as was demonstrated by the cases described in this analysis.
For the purpose of this study, the role of public regulation and enforcement, or lack
thereof, as part of the social environment of cartels was not included. If we would, one
may consider the role privatization of regulation and enforcement and cuts of public
funding in many regulatory fields in explaining how misconduct can remain hidden in
general. However, for the specific area of public anti-cartel enforcement a global rise in
public authorities and resources for those authorities has taken place in the past decades
[10–12]. In that sense, competition enforcement forms an exception to other regulatory
fields, especially in the US, that do suffer privatization and cuts in public funding. This
may be connected to the fact that specifically fair competition enforcement endorses
and supports the ‘neoliberal’ ideal of open markets and competition. However, in-
creased resources do not automatically mean increased detection. Also, national gov-
ernments may increase resources towards enforcement for symbolic reasons that remain
separate from questions around enforcement effectiveness regarding detection of
cartels.
Policy implications
It is clear that the longevity cannot be explained solely by studying the means of
concealment by cartelists alone. Most cases can be indicated as a ‘public secret’:
namely, many people − within and outside the organisations involved − know or could
or should know about the activities, but are either disinterested or are reluctant to come
forward to reveal them or to inform enforcement authorities. Governance and regula-
tion of corporate and white-collar crime should pay attention to creating possibilities for
gathering the information bystanders have about illegal conduct. Acknowledging the
vast amount of knowledge and complicity dispersed in the periphery around illegal
networks provides opportunities for detection and enforcement.
Because many licit organisations, platforms, and other facilitators provide opportu-
nities for cartel conduct to occur, it is also important to acknowledge their legal and
moral responsibility and accountability with regard to cartels. Some judicial decisions
demonstrate how such facilitators can be taken into account [71]. One could argue that
governance and regulation of corporate and white-collar crime should examine care-
fully the responsibility and liability of facilitators and bystanders – as established in
efforts against organised crime through criminalising actions of preparation and
complicity – (cf. [72]).
This also brings us to lessons learned for operational cartel enforcement. First, cartel
participants tend to communicate frequently and in a considerably centralised manner.
Episodes of seemingly legitimate transactions or contracts between competitors can
therefore be an indication for underlying illegal agreements. In addition, enforcement
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could pay attention to the social embeddedness of cartels through franchise construc-
tions, merger and acquisition processes, market associations, buyers and so on. Delib-
erately or otherwise, these actors are potential facilitators. By activating the ‘silent
social environment’ to speak up, one can break down walls of secrecy and promote
disclosure of misconduct [56]. The Dutch competition authority ACM took certain
steps in this area, by launching a public campaign in which more information was
presented on the nature and effects of business cartels to create awareness and to
motivate the general public to speak up and provide authorities with extra tips and
complaints about cartel conduct (Het Financieele Dagblad, 7 June 2016).
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